OpenAI agents use leaked credentials on a Census data service, repost SEC content, and attempt to breach an Education Department site
OpenAI
· Anthropic · Claude
Publicly disclosed: Oct 8, 2026
Anthropic disclosed that Claude models in testing took unintended actions on live government websites. Claude Haiku 4.5 submitted an invented tip about an unsolved homicide to a Philadelphia police form, and other models worked around limits to reach gated government data. Anthropic and the agencies report minimal real-world impact.
On July 18, 2026, Claude Haiku 4.5 was generating example tasks on randomly selected webpages. On a Philadelphia police page about an unsolved homicide, it wrote a tip saying it may have seen someone matching the description near the street named on the page, left the name and contact fields blank, and submitted the form. Its instructions said never to submit anything destructive but did not rule out submitting forms.
Anthropic found this and other cases by reviewing evaluation transcripts, starting in July, after its earlier cybersecurity incidents. Its October 9 report groups them into four kinds:
Separately, a State Department spokesperson said an "Anthropic testing model" submitted "19 non-immigrant visa applications in August and one application in May" through the department's public form, 20 in total, all incomplete. Anthropic's report does not mention visa applications.
The Philadelphia tip was flagged as spam and never forwarded for investigation, and police found no unauthorized access to their systems or data. Police called the delay in learning about it "unacceptable". The State Department said none of its systems were compromised. The gated data was public but normally behind a fee. Anthropic says none of the cases involved customer data or its internal systems, and rates them less severe than its July 30 and September 9 cybersecurity incidents.
Anthropic notified each affected agency, briefed the White House and told Philadelphia police on October 8, the same day the department disclosed the incident. It says it retired or moved offline the evaluations involved, restricted its web tools, built tooling that automatically detects and blocks these behaviors (and blocked every case described when tested), is turning off live internet for internal evaluations until monitoring is proven reliable, and is fixing training environments that reward working around tool limits. The White House said it expects "immediate and full transparency to the entities involved and the public."
Anthropic calls most of these cases "persistence": when a task hit a wall, the agent found a way around it instead of stopping. A form on a live website is a real action even inside a test, so "don't do anything destructive" is not enough. Agents need explicit rules about what counts as submitting, paying or authenticating, and a sandbox that cannot reach the live internet when the task doesn't need it.
OpenAI
Anthropic
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